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Abstract. We present an implementation of SOTER, a run-time as-
surance framework for building safe distributed mobile robotic (DMR)
systems, on top of the Robot Operating System (ROS). The safety of
DMR systems cannot always be guaranteed at design time, especially
when complex, off-the-shelf components are used that cannot be verified
easily. SOTER addresses this by providing a language-based approach for
run-time assurance for DMR systems. SOTER implements the reactive
robotic software using the language P, a domain-specific language de-
signed for implementing asynchronous event-driven systems, along with
an integrated run-time assurance system that allows programmers to use
unfortified components but still provide safety guarantees. We describe
an implementation of SOTER for ROS and demonstrate its efficacy using
a multi-robot surveillance case study, with multiple run-time assurance
modules. Through rigorous simulation, we show that SOTER enabled
systems ensure safety, even when using unknown and untrusted compo-
nents.
Keywords: Distributed mobile robotics · Autonomous systems · Run-
time assurance
1 Introduction
The design of runtime monitoring components has become an integral part of
the development process of distributed mobile robotic (DMR) systems. Runtime
monitoring is essential for maintaining situational awareness, assessing the health
of a robot, and most importantly for detecting any irregularities at runtime and
consequently deploying the necessary countermeasures when such irregularities
occur. The growing complexity of DMR systems, along with the utilization of
uncertified off-the-shelf components and complex machine-learning models that
are difficult to verify at design time, has made runtime assurance a crucial com-
ponent for building robust DMR systems [15].
In this paper, we present an implementation of SOTER [2], a runtime as-
surance framework for building safe distributed mobile robotics, on top of the
Robot Operating System (ROS)3. In SOTER, components of a DMR system
3 https://www.ros.org
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Fig. 1: RTA module in SOTER.
are defined as runtime assurance (RTA) modules implementing a Simplex archi-
tecture [16]. An RTA module based on Simplex (see Figure 1) consists of two
controllers, an advanced controller (AC) and a safe controller (SC), and a deci-
sion module that implements a switching logic between the AC and SC. The AC
is used for operating the system under nominal circumstances. This is usually an
optimized controller based on advanced heuristics or complex learning-enabled
components such as machine-learning-based perception modules. This makes it
hard to provide any guarantees on the behavior of the AC, especially, when it
is an off-the-shelf component that cannot be verified at design time. To, never-
theless, guarantee the safety of a system using such controllers, the system can
always default to a certified back-up controller, the SC, that takes over oper-
ating the system when anomalies in the behavior of the AC are detected. For
example, the SC could be based only on reliable sensors that navigate a robot
to a safe state. The detection of faulty behavior is guaranteed by the decision
module, which is a certified monitor that observes the state of the robot. The
decision module decides whether it is necessary to switch from the AC to the
SC to keep the robot in a safe state and when to switch back to the AC to
utilize the high performance of the AC to optimally achieve the objectives of
the robot. In DMR systems, components within the robot as well as any sys-
tems connected to the robot are communicating asynchronously. In SOTER, the
various robot components are implemented as asynchronously communicating
RTA modules. This is realized by implementing the modules in the language P
[3], a verifiable programming language designed for writing asynchronous event-
driven code, which can be compiled down to code executable on platforms such
as widely used platforms as the Robot Operating System (ROS).
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The implementation of SOTER presented in this paper maintains a simi-
lar approach to implementing the robot components as RTA modules with the
following new extensions:
– A refactorization of SOTER to support portability onto various Robot SDK’s.
The refactorization separates the software stack implementing the robot from
the used robot SDK. Implemented in P, this allows us to provide a robot
implementation with formal guarantees on the behavior of the interacting
robot components. This also allows us to easily port this framework on to
other robot SDK’s.
– The refactorization also includes a separation between the implementation
of robot’s RTA modules’ logic and the actual AC and SC implementations
used in these RTA modules. This allows us, in a plug-and-play fashion, to
easily link the calls of the AC’s and SC’s in the RTA modules to external
implementations of the controllers.
– A concrete integration of the SOTER framework onto widely used robot SDK
ROS. We provide an implementation of a software interface that implements
the communication with the ROS SDK. Integration onto other robot SDK’s
can be done in a similar way.
The implementation of the framework, details and videos on the examples
presented in Section 3, and a guideline for using the framework can be found
on the following website https://github.com/Drona-Org/SOTERonROS. This
includes instructions on how to execute the examples presented in the paper.
2 Architecture of SOTER on ROS
In this section, we outline the architecture of the new implementation of the
SOTER framework. The framework borrows from the Drona framework [4] and
is similarly comprised of three layers. The application layer, the robot software
stack, and the robot SDK. The application layer implements an application re-
lated task planner that is responsible for computing application related tasks
and distributing them amongst the robots for execution. The software stack of
each robot consists of an interface to establish the communication with task
planner, a motion planner, and a plan executor, in addition to a set of decision
modules. In contrast to the Drona framework, the motion planner and the plan
executor are implemented as RTA modules that are linked to one of the decision
modules and to implementations of their safe and advanced controllers.
The implementation of the monitors used by the decision modules, and also
the implementation of the safe and advanced controllers for both the motion
planner and the plan executor are provided as C++ modules in a separate library.
The library also plays the role of the interface which abstracts away many of the
underlying details needed for the robot SDK, and make them accessible to the
modules in the software stack as well as to the task planner.
In the following, we give some details on the implementation of each of the
three layers and the integration into robot SDK’s such as ROS. We use a robot
surveillance application to elaborate on some of the implementation details.
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Fig. 2: SOTER Framework Architecture.
Task Planner. A task planner is implemented specifically for a certain applica-
tion. For example, a task planner for a surveillance application computes certain
way-points on the map that should be visited by the robots. A task planner in
our framework is implemented as a state machine in the language P [3]. This
allows asynchronous communication between the task planner and P state ma-
chines defining the robots. A state machine in P has its own event queue on
which it receives events published by other machines that communicate with
this machine. The task planner can send events defining tasks to the queues
of the robot machines for execution. In its initial state, the task planner state
machine, spawns a number of robots to execute application related tasks. After
initializing the robots, the task planner computes the tasks to be executed and
publishes the tasks to the event queues of the different robots.
Robot Software Stack. The software stack consists of three predefined P state
machines, the robot machine, the motion planner, and the plan executor, in
addition to other application-dependent P state machine defining the decision
modules used by the motion planner and the plan executor. When the task
planner spawns a robot, a new software stack is setup with a new robot machine,
motion planner, plan executor and all the decision modules, In the following, we
provide some details on the state machines defining the robot machine, motion
planner, and plan executor. All implementations can be found on the frameworks
webpage under the software stack directory.
The robot machine serves as the interface between the task planner and the
motion planner of a robot. The tasks assigned by the task planner are queued
in the event queue of the robot machine. When an event is received, the robot
machines processes the event and forwards the event to the queue of the motion
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planner. For each task, processed and sent by the robot machine, the motion
planner computes a plan to execute this task. For example, in the robot surveil-
lance application, the tasks are destinations the need to be visited and the plan
would be a series of way-points to reach each destination. The state machine
processes the tasks one by one. For each task a plan is computed and then sent
to the plan executor. A plan for the next task is only computed after the plan ex-
ecutor informs the motion planner that the plan has been executed. The motion
planner state machine is defined as an RTA module. Depending on the decisions
made by the associated decision module, the plan is computed by an advanced
or safe planner. Computing the plan can be done by calling external functions
for the safe and advanced controllers, for example, using functions from motion
planning libraries such as the Open Motion Planning Library (OMPL) [17].
When a plan is computed, it is forwarded to the plan executor. The plan
executor is a state machine that implements another RTA module. For each
step of the plan, the plan executor consults a decision module on what type of
controller to use. For example, in the surveillance application, if a step is leading
to a collision with another robot, the plan executor will use a safe controller
to guide the robot around the other robot. If the battery level is low, the safe
controller might decide to first go to the charging station before going to the next
point given by the plan. When the plan is executed, the plan executor informs
the motion planner and waits for the next plan to be sent by the motion planner.
ROS Integration. The software stack is built on top of a software interface given
as a library of C++ modules. The library contains all foreign functions that
implement the monitors for the decision modules and the safe and advanced
controller for the RTA modules. We chose C++ for writing the external function
because P programs can be compiled in to C++ programs, which in turn can
compiled to ROS executables. To build the ROS executables, we used the Catkin
build system (http://wiki.ros.org/catkin/conceptual_overview). Catkin
build system (popularly used for ROS projects) contains a source space where
programmers include their source code. We have modified it so that this source
space can support P files. This is done using the P compiler and Cmake to
compile the P programs into executables that can be run on ROS.
3 Case Studies
We present two case studies with multiple runtime assurance modules. We use
the case studies to show how to use SOTER on ROS framework to build safe
robotics that provide safety guarantees while maintaining performance, and
to demonstrate the re-usability of the framework on a variety of robotics ap-
plications. In SOTER, application task planners, the Cpp module layer, and
their RTA modules, need to be implemented independently for each application.
The software stack in SOTER on ROS is largely reusable for many applica-
tions. The implementation and videos of these case studies can be found on
https://github.com/Drona-Org/SOTERonROS.
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Fig. 3: Application level code for Drone Surveillance Protocol. This is a simplified
version of the task planner. For the full P state machine we refer the reader to
the surveillance application directory on the frameworks webpage.
3.1 Drone Surveillance Protocol
The Drone Surveillance Protocol case study demonstrates how to develop a
SOTER on ROS application. In this case study, there is a single drone explor-
ing a 5x5 grid with 4 walls on the boundaries of the workspace. The goal of
the drone is to explore the workspace (visit a series of locations), while ensur-
ing the drone does not collide with the walls. To implement the case study,
the programmer must first implement the application level goals in the task
planner, which is implemented as a P state machine. The task planner, as de-
picted in Figure 3, consists of two states, the initialization state (Init) and
the surveillance state (StartSurveillance). The former is used to initialize
the relevant workspace information and the robots within the application. The
surveillance state is used to send destination information to the different robots,
which in the case of the machine in Figure 3 is done in the order of the robot’s
id’s. Here, DestinationsEvent is the event queued into the robot machine, and
destinations is the corresponding payload of the event.
The P state machine implementing the robot machine in the drone’s soft-
ware stack is responsible for setting up communication with the drone’s own
motion planner, and initializing with ROS, which is done using a foreign function
RobotROSSetup() that the programmer implements to connect the P machine
with its ROS node. The robot machine forwards the destination point from the
task planner to the motion planner, which then computes a series of way points
to reach that destination. In our case studies, we use the Open Motion Planning
Library’s motion planner [17], and make it accessible in P using a foreign func-
tion. Finally, these sequence of way points are sent to the drone’s plan executor,
that physically executes this plan on the drone. It does so, using a series of for-
eign functions from the C++ modules that implement the drone’s controllers,
which is provided by the programmer.
In our case study, the motion planner has no knowledge of the obstacles
present in the workspace. As a result, the drone occasionally visits points that
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are very close to the walls. In order to ensure the drone does not collide with the
walls, we construct a collision avoidance runtime assurance module. The RTA
module defining the plan executor guides the robot to visit a series of locations
across the workspace. The decision module monitors the location of the drone,
and specifically checks to see if the next way point is located in a problematic
location on the workspace. The decision module also has a parameter ∆, that
has the ability to look ahead to the next ∆ way points of the drone’s current
motion plan and confirm none are in dangerous locations in the workspace. If
the decision module finds that the one of the next ∆ way points bring the drone
too close to one of the walls, it transfers control to the safe controller. The safe
controller brings the drone back to safety in the middle of the workspace. The
decision module is able to perform this look ahead and return an answer in a
non-substantial amount of time (near instantaneous).
This decision module is implemented in the decision module P state machine,
where the programmer implements their decision logic to determine if the robot
is in a safe/unsafe state. The plan executor communicates with this decision
module machine to determined whether to execute the AC or the SC.
Fig. 4: Drone Surveillance Protocol.
Figure 4 contains a snapshot of the simulation and the terminal used to run
our application. We execute our application by first launching our gazebo simu-
lator in one window (right) and executing the ROS executable (left). The ROS
executable also displays application related information such as the controller
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that is being used and the reason why the decision module decided to switch
to one of the controllers. We also demonstrate the effect of the ∆ parameter of
the decision module in our case study. Increasing values of ∆ cause the decision
module to look ahead further into the drone’s motion plan, and in turn makes
its behavior more conservative in how close the drone can fly near the walls.
Figure 4, compares the drone’s path with ∆ = 1 in red and ∆ = 2 in blue.
3.2 Robot Delivery
In the Robot Delivery case study, we demonstrate the ability to have multiple
robots running asynchronously using decision modules over multiple monitors.
There are two robots (TurtleBot3) that explore a grid with static obstacles. The
goal of the robots is to randomly visit points on the grid indefinitely, while avoid-
ing the static obstacles. The task planner sends each robot randomized empty
destinations on the grids. Each robot has its own copy of the motion planner
and plan executor. The robot machine forwards destination information to the
motion planner, which in this case is the third party Open Motion Planning Li-
brary’s motion planner [17]. The motion planner computes way points to reach
this destination while avoiding the static obstacles of the workspace. The motion
planner also forwards the plan to the plan executor to execute. This process oc-
curs concurrently on both robots so multiple robots can simultaneously navigate
the workspace.
In this case study, we define a decision module with 3 different runtime
monitors: (1) Battery Safety, (2) Geo Fencing, and (3) Collision Avoidance.
The first monitor is battery safety, where we prioritize safely bringing the
robot to its charging station. Here our advanced controller is a node that com-
putes control information given the current motion plan and drives the robot to
the next way point in the plan. The safe controller is a certified planner that
safely brings the robot to its corresponding charging station from its current
position. The decision module observes battery percentage at each way point to
ensure whether there is sufficient battery for executing the next ∆ way points.
The geo-fencing monitor checks whether the robot moves outside of our 5x5
grid. The RTA using this monitor can then ensure that the robot does not
navigate to this region. Here our advanced controller is a node that computes
control information given the current motion plan and drives the robot to the
next way point in the plan. The safe controller prevents further execution of the
plan and skips to the next destination, ensuring the robot remains in the safe
region. The decision module observes the next ∆ at each step, and determines
whether the current robot would eventually explore an unsafe region.
The third safety guarantee is collision avoidance. In the event that the two
robots are simultaneously trying to visit the same destination, we ensure that
a collision does not occur. The advanced controller executes the current motion
plan way point by way point. The safe controller has one of the robots wait
until the other finishes reaching the destination, and then proceeds. The decision
module observes the next∆ way points of both robot, given their current location
and motion plan, and determines whether a collision is imminent.
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In this case study, the decision module machine has 3 different aspects of the
robot it must monitor simultaneously. Each RTA module also has its own AC
and SC and each of the RTA modules must be composed to provide the desired
security guarantees. Hence, the decision module must have an implicit prioriti-
zation of the 3 monitors, to decide which safe controller the Plan executor must
run in the event multiple monitors report unsafe. In our case study, we priori-
tized the RTA modules in the following order: collision avoidance, geo-fencing,
and battery safety. The decision module is able to perform this monitoring task
and return an answer non-substantial time.
4 Related Work
There is a rich body of work on the design of runtime assurance components
for safety-critical systems [1,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13]. Some of these works present
language-based approaches that instrument an implementation of a system to
assure that certain executions are enforced to satisfy certain requirements, other
approaches combine design time techniques with runtime verification techniques
to assure that environment assumptions made at design time also hold at run-
time [1]. For black-box robotic systems, or robotic systems that include off-the-
shelf machine-learning-based components that are hard to verify at design time,
Simplex-based approaches like SOTER are more suitable. Frameworks based on
the Simplex (or Simplex-like) architecture include those presented in [9,11,12,13].
These frameworks are however designed for single component systems, or wrap
the entire system using a single Simplex module, making the design of monitor-
ing components for a distributed setting extremely difficult and complicated. In
comparison, with SOTER, we provide a framework for the design of Simplex-
based RTA modules for distributed robotic systems that builds on a formally
verified robotic software stack and is compatible with a variety of robot SDK’s.
We also note that decision modules in SOTER allow for a principled and safe
way to switch back from the safe controller to the advanced controller to keep
performance penalties to a minimum [2]; subsequently, an alternative approach
for realizing the reverse switching mechanism was presented by Phan et al. [12].
5 Outlook
With SOTER we presented a framework for building safe distributed robotics
with integrated runtime assurance modules. SOTER separates the implementa-
tion of the robot logic from the underlying robot SDK making it compatible with
many robotic platforms. For now combining multiple monitoring decisions of the
decision modules is still a manual step. For the future, we plan on providing a
systematic way to coordinate the different decisions. We also plan to integrate
the framework with a broader class of robotics platforms, planning tools, simu-
lators, and techniques such as introspective environment modeling [14].
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